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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 19, 1954, ~fr. and Mrs. Roland B. Smith of 
Clearfield, Utah, together with Mr. and Mrs. Willia1n 
Robins, 'vere killed in a private airplane crash in Denver, 
Colorado. Roland B. S1nith was at the tin1e of death the 
president and general rnanager of Sn1ith Frozen Foods, 
Inc., and Box Elder Packing Corporation. He left sur-
viving him four children, Roland J. Smith, age 25, 
Ronald B. Smith, age 20, Kathleen May Smith, age 7, 
and Michael Jay Smith, age 2. Mr. Milan D. Smith, 
brother of the deceased, was duly appointed the guardian 
of the estates and persons of the. last two named children, 
and as such guardian filed claim with the Industrial 
Commission of Utah for benefits under the vVorlnnen's 
Compensation Act, naming as defendants, a1nong others, 
the two corporations in which Roland B. Smith was 
president and general manager. 
On August 31, 1955, the Referee for the Industrial 
Commission entered his Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law 'vherein he found, "that at the time of the 
fatal accident, Roland D. Smith was engaged in his capa-
city of a general partner in the Smith Sales Company. 
The only purpose of the trip was selling." On September 
1, 1955, the Commission entered its order adopting these 
Findings and therefore denying the clain1 of the minor 
children of the decedent. A request for rehearing was 
made but 'vas denied by the commission. 
I 'V:ill atten1pt to prove in this brief first that there 
are absolutely no facts in the record 'vhich will substan.;. 
tiate such a finding, but that the same is based on pure 
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2 
speculation, conjecture and guesswork 1n the face of 
uncontradicted evidence to the effect that the deceased 
had nothing to do with the partnership "with the excep-
tion of being present occasionally on consultation meet-
ings in regard to sales policy and determining of sales 
policies, etc," (Emphasis added) and second, that a find-
ing that the deceased was representing the partnership 
does not negative the fact that the deceased was repre-
senting the corporations, and therefore the findings of 
the Commission are fatally defective. 
Before going into the evidence which was presented 
to the Referee at the hearing, I would like to review the 
organization of the Smith companies which are involved 
in this controversy. 
The Albert T. Smith family of Clearfield, Utah, has 
for many years been engaged in the business of food 
processing, canning and freezing. They had at the time 
of the death of the decedent canning plants at four dif-
ferent locations. One at Clearfield, Utah, known as 
Smith Canning Company, two at Brigham City, 
Utah, known as Box Elder Packing Corporation and 
Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., one at Le,viston, Idaho, known 
as Sn1ith Frozen Foods of Idaho, and two at Pendleton, 
Oregon, kno,vn as Sn1ith Frozen Foods of Oregon and 
Smith Canning and Freezing. In addition to this the 
family had a partnership kno,vn as Smith Sales Com-
pany, 'vhich acted as a sales brokerage in disposing of the 
products of the six main corporations. This partnership 
did not have the authority to sell products, but only to 
take orders for eonfir1nation by the producing eompany. 
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Said partnership was composed of the three brothers, 
Milan D. Smith, Victor R. Smith, the deceased Roland 
B. Smith, and one sister, Lavora Smith Wood. 
Milan D. Smith was in charge of the plants at Lewis-
ton, Idaho, and Pendleton, Oregon, as well as the Idaho 
and Oregon operations of the partnership, Smith Sales 
Company. He received a salary from each, including one 
from the partnership. Victor R. Smith was in charge 
of the Clearfield plant, and the Utah operation of the 
Smith Sales Company. He also received a salary from 
the corporation and from the partnership. No one other 
than Victor and Milan was authorized to transact busi-
ness for the partnership, and only then in their particular 
areas. 
The decedent was in charge of the two plants of the 
corporations at Brigham City, Utah, and received a 
salary from each, but he did not receive any salary, even 
token salary, from the partnership, and had nothing to 
do with the partnership. 
Although the officers, directors and partners of the 
various companies were substantially the same, and al-
though they attempted to coordinate their activities, each 
had its own officers, its own payroll, and its own inte-
grated operations. The responsibility of each brother 
was very .clearly defined, and each would have very little, 
if anything, to do with the companies operated by the 
other brothers, except in an advisory capacity on the 
board of directors. It is very important that this fact 
be borne in mind. 
Box Elder Packing Corporation of Brigham City 
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had packed a large tomato crop which was still in the 
company's warehouse as another packing season ap-
proached. Sometime prior to April 19, 1954, the date 
of the fatal accident, it was proposed that a trip be made 
to the midwest, one of the principal purposes of which 
would be to attempt to dispose of this tomato pack. In 
addition to this, it was to be a general business trip, 
and contacts other than selling were to be made, but no 
one had discussed with the decedent the exact nature of 
the business he intended to conduct, except that it was 
known for sure that he intended to contact P.I.E. in 
Chicago pertaining to freight rates on frozen Foods from 
Utah to the Chicago area. Other stops which would be on 
behalf of the corporations only were for purposes of 
procurement of equipment and supplies, and a stop in St. 
Louis if it could be worked in. 
Mr. Bill Robins was the sales manager of the Utah 
part of the partnership brokerage company working di-
rectly under Victor Smith and had discussed with Victor 
in detail the stops which were to be made so far as sales 
were concerned. He was going on the trip to represent 
the brokerage con1pany, and his expenses were all being 
paid by the brokerage company. He was going to be ac-
companied by the deceased, Roland B. Smith, who, as pre-
viously stated, 'vas the president and general manager 
of the corporations w·hose products were to be sold. These 
two 1nen, together with their wives, departed on their trip 
early on the morning of April 19, 1954. In attempting 
to take off from the airport at Denver, Colorado, some-
thing happened to the plane and it crashed, killing aU 
four occupants. The sole question then becomes, "Was 
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the deceased Roland B. Sn1ith representing the corpora-
tions at the time of the fatal accident'" 
POINT I 
EVEN IF IT IS ADMITTED THAT THE ONLY PURPOSE 
OF THE FATAL TRIP WAS TO DISPOSE OF A TOMATO 
PACK, WHI·CH WE CON'TEND IS NOT THE CASE, IT DOES 
NOT F'OLLOW THAT THE DECEDENT WAS REPRESENT-
ING THE PARTNERSHIP AND THE PARTNERSHIP ONLY 
AT THE \TIME OF THE ACCIDENT. 
It came as a complete shock to all of the Smiths and 
their attorney when the Commission found that the de-
ceased, Roland B. Smith, was representing the partner-
ship at the time of the accident, because in fact he had 
nothing to do with the actual operation of the partnership 
and had no authority to transact business on behalf of the 
partnership, and these facts are clearly shown in the 
record. In the light of the decision I again read the 
Transcript to see what facts the Referee relied on in 
reaching his conclusion. The only two things that he 
could rely on are (1) That the deceased was a general 
partner in the Smith Sales Company, and (2) One of 
the primary purposes of the trip was to dispose of a to-
mato pack. Neither of these facts speak directly and say 
what the actual facts were, but only inferences can be 
drawn therefrom, and inferences should only be used 
when there is no direct evidence on the question, which is 
not the case here. True the partnership agreement said 
that he was to "diligently apply himself or herself in the 
business of the said partnership," but did he do so' All 
the testimony in the case clearly says, "No." On the other 
hand, the partnership agreement stated that Victor R. 
Smith was to be the general manager, which he was. 
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Also, the amendments to the partnership agreement show 
that during the year from April, 1947, to April, 1948, the 
deceased had only an $800 investment in the partnership, 
and his investment fluctuated from time to time. Can it 
be said affirmatively after reading the articles of co-
partnership and without further proof that the decedent 
was representing only the partnership on this trip~ 
The fact that one of the principal purposes of the 
trip was selling is just as inconclusive as the partnership 
agreement. Let us assume for the sake of argument that 
the sole purpose of the trip in question was selling. vVhat 
were they going to sell~ The tomato pack of Box Elder 
Packing Corporation. ~Ir. Bill Robins, Sales Manager 
for the Utah part of Smith Sales Company, was going 
to go and there is no question but that he was to represent 
the partnership. All of his expenses were paid by the 
partnership. He had made careful plans for the trip with 
Victor Smith, whom the record clearly shows was the 
only 1ne1nber of the partnership in the Utah area who had 
any actual authority to act for the partnership aside from 
the authority imposed by law to protect third parties. 
So far as Robins was concerned, this was a selling trip. 
One other man "~as to accon1pany Mr. Robins. We sub-
Init by way of argtuuent that had the product to be sold 
been that of the Idaho or Oregon corporations, Milan 
D. Smith 'vould have been the second 1nan. Had the prod-
uct to be sold been that of Sn1ith Canning Con1pany of 
Clearfield, Victor R. Smith would have been the second 
man, and the reasoning is obvious. The fact is, the prod-
net was the to1nato pack of Box Elder Packing Corpora-
tion~ a.nd so Roland B. Smith was the second man. We 
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sub1nit further that in all of these three argumentative 
examples the second man would have been selected to 
represent the corporations over which they had super-
vision and control, and not the partnership. This would 
be true although Milan and Victor were also the general 
managers of the partnership in their respective areas. 
Combine these facts with the fact that the record clearly 
shows that Roland B. Smith had virtually nothing to do 
with the partnership, and you reach the only logical 
result that Roland B. Smith was representing the corpo-
rations, not the partnership, on this fatal trip. 
The record shows the defendant's relationship to the 
partnership. For example, when the witness, Victor R. 
Smith, 'vas asked what work the deceased perfonned in 
connection with the partnership, Smith Sales Company, 
he replied: 
"A. Well, he had very little to do so far as Smith 
Sales was concerned, with the exception of 
being present occasionally on consultation 
meetings in regard to sales policy and deter-
mining of sales policies, etc." Transcript page 
29, line 28. 
Also on line 29, page 62 of the Transcript, we find the 
following: 
"Q. Did Roland have anything to do with the 
operation of Smith Sales Company~ 
A. By that you mean with the actual manage-
ment? 
Q. That is right, actual operation of the com-
pany. 
A. No, except as a consultant, in the consulting 
capacity, I should say." 
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And on cross examination by Mr. Christensen the wit-
ness stated: 
"A. The management of the partnership was re-
stricted to my own management in Utah and 
that of Mr. Milan Smith in Pendleton. 
Q. vVhen you say 'the Inanagement' you mean 
the detailed supervision, the day to day op-
eration~ 
A. Yes. That is there was no one else in the 
partnership authorized to transact business 
except the two of us, and only then in these 
particular areas." (Emphasis added) Trans-
cript page 64, line 18. 
Also the witness ~1elvin Stephenson when asked the 
question, "Did he (Roland B. Smith) actually perform 
any functions in connection with the partnership, other 
than in his advisory capacity as a partner," responded, 
"Not that I know of." In the face of this testimony, and 
nothing in the record to the contrary, how can it be 
said that the decedent "Tas representing the partnership 
and the partnership only at the time of death~ It appears 
that the Industrial Com1nission is placing him in this 
capacity at the time of the accident for the first tin1e in 
the history of the partnership, and without one scrap of 
evidence to warrant their doing so. 
In addition to the above testin1ony we have the fur-
ther fact in the record that both ~Iilan D. Smith and 
'Tictor R. S1nith received salaries fro1n the partnership, 
bnt the decedent received absolutely none. On the other 
hand, he received a salary of $190.75 every two weeks 
frq1n Sn1ith Frozen Foods, Ine., and $163.50 every two 
'veek~ :fron1 Box Elder Packing Corporation. These 
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salaries continued up to and including the date of death, 
and it is safe to assume that had he not been killed they 
would have continued through the entire time he 'vas 
on this trip. It is true that payment of wages alone is not 
conclusive in establishing the relationship of employ-
ment, but it is circumstance which should be considered, 
and the Commission has not done so. On this point see 
the case of Ellegood v. Brashear Freight Lines, 162 S.W. 
2nd 628, 236 Mo. App. 971 and cases cited therein. In 
the case of Davis v. Julian, 107 P. 2nd 745, 152 Kan. 749, 
the court stated: 
"The fact he was paid wages tended to estab-
lish the relationship of employer and employee." 
McKinstry v. Guy Coal Co., 116 Kan. 192, 225 
P. 743, 38 ALR 837. 
And in the case of Rojeski v. Pennington Dairy Fa·rm-
ers, 192 A. 746, 118 N.J.L. 335 they indicated that the 
manner and amount of payment for services rendered 
are not controlling, but shed light on existence of em-
ployer-employee relation which will authorize award 
under Workmen's Compensation Act. 
Another very important factor, and one which has 
virtually been. ignored by the Commission, is that the 
decedent's expenses were being paid, not by the part-
nership whom the Commission has found he was alone 
representing, but by the corporations 'vhose products 
were to be sold. Victor Smith, who was the only man 
authorized to write checks on the partnership account, 
testified unequivocally that the decedent's expenses were 
not being paid by the partnership, but on the contrary, 
the decedent had drawn $200.00 from Smith Frozen 
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Foods, Inc., for "travel expenses" and had taken three 
additional blank checks which he had authority to exe-
cute, one on Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., and two on Box 
Elder Packing Corporation. If the decedent had been 
going to represent the partnership his expenses would 
have been paid by the partnership. The fact they were 
paid by the corporations is the strongest possible proof 
that he was going to represent them. In the findings 
of the Commission the only reference to this strong 
evidence was rnade when they said, "Some evidence was 
introduced that would tend to show that Box Elder 
Packing Corporation underwrote a part of the expense. 
This was supported by a photostatic copy of a check by 
the corporation to Roland B. Smith designated "travel 
expenses." "Tended to show~" Can there be any doubt~ 
They were paying his expenses, and this fact alone should 
have resolved the issue once and for all. "\Vhen asked the 
questions, "There were the t'vo parties going, Who was 
to pay the expenses of the decedent Roland Smith~", 
'Tictor Smith answered, "His expenses were paid by 
Box Elder Packing Corporation." T-60, Line 23. There 
can be no doubt but that the decedent was going on this 
trip to represent the corporations. Furthermore there 
was a cash receipt for gas purchased at Denver found 
in the wallet of the decedent from which it could be in-
ferred that he had purchased the gas. This is the type 
of evidence which I would say "tends to show" that the 
corporations 'vere underwriting part of the expenses of 
the trip, but not clear unquestionable evidence such as 
the faet he drew $200 from the corporation for "travel 
expen~e~," ,,·hich ''Tould do 1nore than just "tend to show." 
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There are still other factors which would show that 
the deceased was representing the corporations 'vhich 
have been ignored by the Commission. For example, 
the packing season of a canning company is compara-
tively short, but still the decedent devoted over two-thirds 
of his time throughout the year to the two corporations 
in Brigham City. The record shows that he went to the 
plants almost daily the year round. On cross examination 
by Mr. Christensen Mr. Victor Smith testified: 
"A. Well, during the balance of the year there 
are three excellent operations. That is dis-
posing of the product packed, repairing ma-
chinery and equipment preparatory for the 
next season's pack, and making necessary con-
tacts with growers and with suppliers to pro-
vide for the product and the material for sub-
sequent years' pack." (Emphasis added.) 
Also in the testimony of Mr. Melvin Stephenson, comp-
troller for the Smith companies, we find the following. 
The witness stated: 
"A. His (Bill Robins) purpose was to make con-
tacts in connection with sales of merchandise 
for the Smith Sales Company." Then I asked 
the question : 
"Q. Now, in connection with the transaction of 
business for Smith Sales Company, would 
the other companies be interested in the same 
contacts so far as that business is concerned 1 
Now for example, say they were going to con-
tact a prospective purchaser in New York, 
would Smith Canning Con1pany and Box El-
der Packing Corporation be interested in that 
operation? 
A. Very definitely. 
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Q. And why? 
A. Well, the welfare of the company depends 
upon the movement of merchandise out of 
the warehouse. 
Q. In other words, not only would the Smith 
Sales Company be interested, but the indi-
vidual corporations from whom the products 
were to be delivered would be interested in 
the transaction also. 
A. That is correct." 
And still another important point is that Smith 
Sales Company did not have the authority to bind the 
individual companies, but only acted as a brokerage for 
the taking of orders which were not binding upon the 
company whose products were being sold until accepted 
by the company itself. This is born out by the testimony 
of Victor R. Smith on cross examination by Mr. Chris-
tensen when he stated, starting at line 8, page 57 of the 
Transcript: 
"A. Well, let me put it this way. A contact might 
be made, but a sale couldn't be made without 
being confirn1ed by the producing plant." 
Where sales had to be confirmed by the producing com-
pany before a binding sale could be made it is only na-
tural that the president and general n1anager of the 
producing companies 'vould go along in order that the 
sale u1ight be con1pleted at the very time of contact, and 
in affir1ning the order and 1naking a binding sale the de-
eedent 'vould be representing the producing company 
and not the partnership because only the producing com-
panies had the authority to co1nplete the sale. Would 
the Industrial Conunission have us believe that the de-
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cedent 'vas representing only the partnership during the 
time they were flying fro1n place to place, but when they 
were 1naking sales he stepped from that employment to 
represent the producing company in confirming the sale? 
Therefore, even assuming that the sole purpose of the 
trip was to 1nake sales, the facts will not substantiate a 
finding that the decedent was representing only the part-
nership and not the corporations at the time of death, 
but at best could only 'varrant a holding that he was 
representing both. 
POINT II 
ALTHOUGH THE FINDINGS OF THE REFEREE WERE 
THAT "THE ONLY PURPOSE OF THE TRIP WAS SELL-
ING'' THE RECORD SHOWS BY CLEAR, UNANBIGUOUS, 
AND UNCONTRADI·CTED FACTS THAT THE ONLY PUR-
POSE OF THE TRIP WAS NOT SELLING. 
At various places throughout the testimony there 
were references to other things which were to be accom-
plished on this trip other than selling. I would like to 
review some of them, starting on line 7, page 34 of the 
T'ranscript. Victor Smith testified: 
"A. Well, as I have stated, it was in the nature of 
a general business trip. There were sales con-
tacts to be made, as well as contacts to be 
made, as I mentioned this one on freight 
rates, other possibly on equipment, procure-
ment. It was just a general business trip." 
On cross examination by Mr. Christensen starting with 
line 7, page 50 of the Transcript we find the following: 
"Q. So that to the best of your knowledge, the 
entire trip was for the purpose of sales 'vith 
the exception of one contact in Chicago with 
P.I.E., is that right 0? 
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A. Well now, that is as far as the Smith Sales' 
relationship to this thing is concerned. That 
is, in other words-Let me put it this way. 
Roland intended to make a number of calls 
in connection with his part of the activities 
but I didn't review those calls with him in 
detail. I have no knowledge of them. 
Q. You don't know what those calls were~ 
A. No. I had no occasion to review those with 
him, St. Louis, for instance, was mentioned 
as a possible call if they could work it in, and 
I don't know what Roland's business would 
have been iri St. Louis. As I say, I didn't dis-
cuss with Roland the details of his business." 
In order to sustain their decision that the decedent 
was representing the partnership and the partnership 
only, they would have to find that the sole purpose of 
the trip was selling, which finding they have made. In 
order to do so, however, they have had to ignore the 
uncontradicted evidence, which they do not have the right 
to do in the absence of conflicting evidence. If other 
business was to be done which did not concern the part-
nership, then it would follow that the decedent was repre-
senting the corporations. No one except the deceased 
knew all of the business which he contemplated trans-
acting. Suffice i~ to say, however, it was a "general busi-
ness trip." A stop was contemplated in St. Louis, and 
a "nurnber of calls in connection with his part of the ac-
tivities," including the stop at P.I.E. in Chicago. These 
facts have been cornpletely ignored by the Commission, 
and had they not been so ignored, the award could not 
have been denied. In the face of the above uncontradicted 
evidence, the finding of the Referee as adopted by the 
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Conn11ission that the only purpose of the trip was sell-
ing should not be allowed to stand. 
POINT III 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDING OF F'ACT THAT THE 
DECEDENT WAS REPRESENTING THE PARTNERSHIP 
DOES NOT RESOLVE T'HE ISSUE AS TO WHETHER HE 
WAS REPRESENTING THE CORPORATIONS AND THE 
FINDINGS ARE, THEREFORE, FATALLY DEFECTIVE. 
LIABILITY FOR COMPENSATION IN THE ·CASE OF JOINT 
OR CONCURRENT EMPLOYMENT BY TWO EMPLOYERS IS 
JOINT AND SEVERAL AND LIABILITY LIES WITH THE 
CORPORATIONS ALTHOUGH HE MAY, AT THE SAME 
TIME, HAVE BEEN REPR.ESENTING THE PARTNERSHIP. 
Here again for the sake of argument I would like to 
assu1ne a set of facts, which I strongly insist did not ex-
ist; namely, that the deceased was representing the part-
nership at the time of the accident. As early as 1929 in 
the case of Murray v. Wasatch Grading Cornpany, 73 U. 
430, 27 4 P. 940, this court held that, 
"The mere fact that the plaintiff may have 
been an employee of the railroad company at the 
time he was injured did not necessarily preclude 
him from also being an e1nployee of the defend-
ant." 
In the findings of the Commission in the ease at hand 
they correctly stated the question and ultimate fact to be, 
"Whether or not the deceased was an employee (of the 
corporations) in the course of his employment at the time 
of the fatal injury." The Findings and Conclusions then 
go on to hold that he was working for the partnership. 
But this does not answer the very issue 'vhich they them-
selves pose. Before the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of law will support a denial of the clairn they must find 
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affirmatively and not by inference that the decedent was 
not working for the companies who are being sued, and it 
is not sufficient to find that he was working for someone 
else. 
Generally speaking a positive finding which is in-
consistent with the ultimate fact which is to be deter-
mined will support the decision. For example, if the 
ultimate fact to be proven or found is, "Did the decedent 
die frorn a heart attack," this could be supported by a 
finding that he died of cancer without an express finding 
that he did not die from a heart attack. Where this 
method is used, however, to support the finding of the 
ultimate fact the two facts must be incompatable. That is, 
if one is so, the other cannot be. This is not the case at 
hand. The finding that the deceased was engaged in his 
capacity as a general partner in the Smith Sales Com-
pany and that the only purpose of this trip was selling 
does not negative the fact that he was also representing 
and was the employee of the corporations, which is the 
ultimate fact which must be determined. For this reason 
the Findings and Conclusions of the Commission are not 
sufficient to support the order denying compensation. 
In the case of Rice v. Keystone View Co., 297 N.W. 
841, 843, 210 ~linn. 227, they held that where a traveling 
salesrnan was employed by two different companies to 
represent them and sell their products, a.nd on morning 
of fatal accident he was on his 'vay in his automobile 
to demonstrate products of both companies, first the 
products of the one company at one city, and then the 
products of the other company at a different city, the em-
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ployment was ''concurrent e1nployment," and joint award 
of compensation against both companies was correct. 
Then in the case of Pacific E1nployer's Ins~trance Co. v. 
Industrial Accident Com1nission, 136 P 2nd 633, 58 Cal. 
App. 2nd 262 at page 637 we find the following: 
"Where the facts support the finding of a 
joint hiring of a work1nan by two or more enlploy-
ers, each employer beco1nes liable for colnpensa-
tion." 
N. Y. Indemnity Co. v. I.A.C., 126 Cal. App. 
37, 14 P 2nd 160; 
Standard Ace. Ins. Co. v. I.A.C., 127 Cal. App. 
443, 11 P. 2nd 401; 
Ragas v. I.A.C., 83 Cal. App. 313, 256 P. 487. 
And again in Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corp. v. 
U. 8. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., (Ariz., 1945) 162 P. 2nd 
609, page 614 we find the following: 
"Where two or more persons are en1ployers 
of the same employee engaged, as here, for the 
com1non benefit of both, and so found and deter-
mined by the proper tribunal, their liability is 
joint and common." 
Frederick A. Stresenreuter, Inc., v. I.A.C., 
322 Ill. 187, 152 N.E. 548; 
Sargent v. A. B. J(nowlson Co., 224 Mich. 686, 
195 N.W. 810, 30 ALR 993; 
Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. Indus-
trial Accident Co,ntmission, 123 Cal. App. 
443, 11 P. 2nd 401. 
In Sgattone v. Mulholland & Got~vals, 138 A. 855, 290 Pa. 
341, 58 ALR 1463, they say: 
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"Before a recovery can be had by the claim-
ants, it must appear that the deceased was an em-
ployee. In determining this fact, it is immaterial 
that he may also have been employed by a second 
person." 
Atherholt v. William Stoddard Co., 286 Pa~ 
278, 133 Atl. 504; 
Garman v. Cambria Title Savings & Trust 
Co., 88 Pa. Sup. Ct. 525. 
In the case of Freedman v. Industrial Accident Com-
mission, et al, (Calif.) 154 P. 2nd 922, page 925, in dis-
senting opinion it is stated: 
"Since Freedman was found by the Commis-
sion to be an en1ployer of Ross, and a separate 
award was rendered against him, it is immaterial 
whether Freedn1an was the sole employer or mere-
ly a co-employer of the workman. In either event 
he would be liable for the full amount of the 
award." 
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. r. I.A.C., 58 Cal. 
App. 2nd 262, 136 P 2nd 633; 
Standard .Accident Ins. Co. v. I.A.C., 123 
Cal. App. 443, 11 P 2nd 401; 
N. Y. Ind Co. v. Industrial .Accident Commis-
sion, 126 Cal. App. 37, 14 P 2nd 160. 
Also in Schaefer v. Industrial Cornmission, 185 Wis. 317, 
201 N.W. 396, the court expressed the opinion that any-
one of the employers at the time workman became in-
capacitated by the occupational disease would be liable 
for the whole a1nount of the award. So we see the law 
appears very clear that where employee was acting with-
in scope of employtnent with two employers at time of 
death, dependents are entitled to proceed under Compen-
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sation Act against either or both. Because of this it is 
imperative that the Co1n1nission's Findings determine 
the question ""\Vas he representing the corporations at 
the time of the accident," and it is not sufficient merely 
to find that he was also representing some one else. 
POINT IV 
THE COMMISSION IN FINDING THE DECEDENT WAS 
REPRESENTING THE PARTNERSHIP AND THE PART-
NERSHIP ONLY AT THE TIME OF INJURY HAS DONE SO 
WITHOUT ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDEN·CE AND HAS 
WITHOUT ANY REASON OR CAUSE, ARBITRARILY AND 
CAPRICIOUSLY REFUSED TO BELIEVE AND ACT UPON 
THE CREDIBLE AND UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENC·E IN 
THE RECORD. 
I would_ venture to say that there is no other field 
of law in which this court has spoken more often than 
in regard to Workmen's Cornpensation. To review all 
of the cases would be in1practical. Suffice to say that 
the rule has been stated over and over again, that the 
Supreme Court will not reverse a finding of fact made 
by the Industrial Comission if there is a conflict in the 
evidence and if there is substantial evidence which will 
support the finding which they have made. I an1 keenly 
aware of the extre1ne burden which this places upon a 
claimant who is attempting to have a question of fact 
set aside. 
In the case of K avalinakis v. I~ndustrial Conunis-
sion, et al., 67 U. 174, 246 P. 698, decided in 1926, after 
making a long argurnent on why the decisions of the 
Commission pertaining to question of fact should not be 
disturbed this court had this to say : 
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"By what has been said we do not wish to be 
understood as holding that there is no limit to 
the Commission's power or authority in dis-
regarding or in regusing to give effect to uncon-
tradicted evidence. The Commission may not, 
without any reason or cause, arbitrarily or ca-
priciously refuse to believe and to act upon cred-
ible evidence which is unquestioned and undis-
puted." 
This cost has been cited approvingly in over twenty-
four Utah cases alone and has never been modified or 
changed. It is the strongest possible case for the argu-
ment that their decisions are final but still the court 
recognized the fact that the Commission can not dis-
regard or refuse to give effect to uncontradicted evidence 
or arbitrarily or capriciously refused to believe and to 
act upon credible evidence. This we maintain and Com-
mission has done in this case. 
In the case of Rukavina et al. v. Industrial Com-
ntission of Utah, et al., 68 U. 1, 248 P. 1103 decided in 
1926 shortly after the Kavalinakis case we find the fol-
lowing: 
"Still, like a court or jury, the conumss1on 
is required to take as true undisputed or uncon-
tradicted testimony or evidence, if not opposed to 
probabilities or common knowledge, or not con-
trary to natural or physical la,v, or inherently 
improbable or inconsistent with facts and cir-
curnstances in evidenee, or uncontradictory in 
itself, ~·"". In other words, the commission may 
not, any rnore than a court or jury, arbitrarily 
or capriciously disbelieve or disregard testimony 
or evidence." 
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In the case of Harness et al. vs. Industrial Commis-
sion of Utah, et al., 81 U. 276, 17 P. 2nd 277 the court 
makes the following staten1ent: 
"The testimony of the witnesses is remark-
ably free from conflict and has all of the char-
acteristics of being truthful. Counsel for the de-
fendants have not pointed out and are unable to 
find anything in the testin1ony offered in behalf 
of the applicants to justify disbeleiving the same. 
It is the established law in this jurisdiction that 
under our Industrial Act dependency and its ex-
tent are questions of fact for the deter1nination 
of the Industrial Commission. This court may not 
disturb the findings of fact made by the com-
mission unless it appears that the commission has 
applied an illegal standard, or has found a fact 
without evidence to support it, or Jvas made a 
finding against uncont~radicted credible evidence. 
On an application to this court the question of 
whether there is any evidence to support a find-
ing of the commission, or whether there is any 
justifiable reason for making a finding against 
uncontradicted credible evidence, is one of law. 
" *** In the absence of some reasonable basis 
for disbelieving the uncontradicted evidence of-
· fered in support of an application for compensa-
tion, the commission may not disregard such evi-
denc£1." (Emphasis added) 
This court 'vent on to annual the order denying com-
pensation. 
Once again in the case of Batchelor v. Industrial 
Commission of [Jtah, 86 U. 261, 42 P. 2nd 996 this court 
reiterated the above rule when it stated : 
"Where the conunission has made its find-
ings and conclusions and denied co1npensation, it 
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is not for the court to disturb them unless it ap-
pears from the record that the commission has 
disregarded competent evidence, substantial in 
character and uncontradicted, without reasonable 
basis therefor." 
Kavalinakis v. I. C., 67 U. 174, 246 P. 698; 
Hauser v. I. C., 77 U. 419, 296 P. 780; 
Ostler v. I. C., 84 U. 428, 36 P. 2nd 95. 
Before a finding of the Commission can be allowed 
to stand it must be based upon substantial evidence. Just 
what is meant by "substantial evidence" was decided in 
the case of Milford Copper Co. of Utah, et al., v. In-
dustrial Commission of Utah, et al., 61 U. 37, 210 P. 993 
where they stated: 
"As to what may or may not be regarded as 
substantial evidence within the meaning of our 
Industrial Commission act, and the procedure 
under it, we think the meaning of that expres-
sion is aptly defined in 4 Wards and Phrases, 
Second, p. 751, which reads : 
" 'By "substantial evidence" is not meant 
that which goes beyond a mere "scintilla of evi-
dence," since evidence may go beyond ·a mere 
scintilla, and yet not be substantial evidence. 
must possess something of substance and rele-
vant consequence and not consist of vague, un-
certain, or irrelevant matter, not carrying the 
quality of proof or having fitness to induce· con-
viction. Substantial evidence is such that reason-
able men n1ay fairly differ as to whether it estab-
lishes plaintiffs case, and, if all reasonable men 
must conclude that it does not establish such 
case, then it is not substantial evidence. !" 
Jenkins & Reynolds Co." v. Alphena Portland 
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Cement Co., 147 Fed. 641, 643, 77 C.C.A. 
625. 
POINT V 
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECEDENT WAS REP-
RESENTING THE CORPORATIONS AT THE TIME OF 
DEATH IS A JURISDICTIONAL QUESTION TO BE DE-
·CIDED UPON A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE. 
Generally speaking, questions of fact will be allowed 
to stand if there is any substantial evidence to support 
them as the term is defined under Point IV. I strongly 
contend that there is no substantial evidence in this case, 
and it is even more clear that a preponderance of the 
evidence could or would not support the finding. 
In the case of Miller v. Industrial Commission, 97 U. 
226, 92 P. 2nd 342, this court stated : 
"Whether Miller was employed by Farming-
ton City and was therefore entitled to workmen's 
compensation or was employed by Griffith is a 
jurisdictional question which we must decide on 
a preponderance of the evidence." 
Weber Co.-Ogden City Relief Commission 
v. l.C., 93 U. 85, 71 P. 2nd 177, Holt v. I.C., 
96 U. 484, 87 P. 2nd 686. 
Justice Wolfe dissented on this point in a special con-
curring opinion, but the same proposition was reiterated 
in the case of Stover Bedding Co., et al.,. v. Industrial 
Commission, 99 U. 423, 107 P. 2nd, 1027, when this court 
stated: 
"The first question to be deter1nined is 
whether Knudsen was an en1ployee of Stover 
Bedding Co., or whether his relationship with 
plaintiff was that of independent contractor. We 
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have on several occasions held that such is a 
jurisdictional question, which we must decide 
upon a preponderance of the evidence." 
Angel v. Industrial Commission, 64 U. 105, 
228 P. 509; 
Luker Sand N Gravel Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 82 U. 188, 23 P. 2nd 225; 
Norris v. Industrial Commission, 96 U. 484, 
87 P. 2nd 686; 
Miller v. Industrial Contmission 97 U. 226, 
92 P. 2nd 342. 
Justice Wolfe again dissented. 
A preponderance of the evidence shows without a 
doubt that the decedent was representing the corpora-
tions at the time of the fatal accident and the dependants 
should be allowed benefits under the Act. 
CONCLUSION 
Roland B. Smith at the time of death was president 
and general manager of Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., and 
Box Elder Packing Corporation, both of Brigham City, 
Utah. He went to the plants daily the year around and 
devoted over two-thirds of all his time to the two cor-
porations. He was charged \vith conducting the plant 
operations, disposing the pack and procuring ne'v equip-
ment and supplies. He received a salary from both cor-
porations. At the tilne of death he was making a trip to 
the Midwest to dispose of a tomato pack of these corpo-
rat 1ons, as '\Tell as to conduct other general business re-
garding procurement of equipment and supplies and 
discussion of freight rates in Chicago. All of his expenses 
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for the trip 'vere being paid by the~e corporations. 
The Con11nission in reaching a clecision that at the 
tin1e of death he was represe11tin~ the partnership has 
co1npletely ignored all of these facts and has reached 
its conclusion arbitrarily and capriciously without any 
substantial evidence to support its findings. For thi~ 
reason and for the other reasons as ennumerated in this 
brief, the order of the Commission denying the clailn 
of the t'vo 1ninor children should be set aside. 
Respectfully submitted, 
REX W. HARDY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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